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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
RICHARD A. ISAACSON,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
CLAIR DORIUS,
Defendant and Appellant,
and

Case No. 18166

LAWRENCE W. LYNN,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
CLAIR DORIUS,
Defendant and Appellant.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE
.CONTAINED IN REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
Order Denying Motion for New Trial was entered in the
trial court on November 13, 1981.

Defendant and appellant filed

his Notice of Appeal on December 16, 1981.
plaintiffs and respondents made a

~otion

On December 31, 1981,

in this court to Dismiss

this appeal for lack of jurisdiction for the reason that the said
Notice of Appeal was not timely filed.

This Court denied said

motion after hearing on June 18, 1982, "without prejudice to
raise as an issue on appeal."
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The issue of jurisdiction was raised as an issue on
appeal by respondents in their Brief Raising Jurisdictional Issue,
which was set forth as Point II in the Brief of Respondents filed
herein.
Appellant has filed a response to that jurisdictional
issue in a brief entitled Reply Brief of Appellant, served by mail
on December 31, 1982.

In fact, the said Reply Brief is devoted

entirely to the jurisdictional issue raised by respondents.

Thus,

had appellant filed a reply brief on the non-jurisdictional issues,
respondents would have no right to further respond by brief thereto.
However, since respondents have raised the jurisdictional issue,
and appellant has responded thereto, respondents properly have the
right to reply to the material raised by the appellant on the jurisdictional issue, and respondents respectfully submit the following
as their response thereto.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

NOTICE OF APPEAL OF

DEFENDAi.~T

AND APPELLANT, CLAIR DORIUS,

WAS NOT TIMELY.
Appellant attempts to establish the timeliness of his
appeal by resort to two arguments as follows:
(1)

Appellant claims that Section 63-37-1, et seq .. , Utah

Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, applies to the courts and must be
construed as providing that the Notice of Appeal mailed to the Clerk
of the Court shall be deemed filed when mailed; and
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(2)

Appellant claims that he is entitled to the benefit

of Rule 6(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in this case and is
thus entitled to one month and three days in which to file Notice
of Appeal.
We desire to deal briefly with each of these propositions.
( 1)

SECTION 63-37-1, ET SEQ., IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE COURTS.
Appellant appears to concede that Rule 73(a), Utah Rules

of Civil Procedure, grants appellant one month in which to appeal
and appears to concede that that rule requires that the appeal be
filed with the District Court.

The argument then proceeds that

Rule S(e) defines filing as being filed with the Clerk of the court
and the argument then proceeds that, since the Clerk of the Court
is also the County Clerk, and since the County is a political subdivision, then therefore the County Clerk is a sort of political subdivision, and therefore papers sent to this Clerk pursuant to said
Section 63-37-1, et seq., must be deemed filed when mailed.
We respectfully submit that that result does not follow
at all.

Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah pro-

vides that the County Clerks "shall be ex officio clerks of the
District Courts."

Thus, these Clerks duly have a dual role .. They

are County Clerks and as such carry out a role in county government,
and they are Clerks of the Court and as such are an integral part
of the court system.

This dual role is clearly spelled out in Sec-

tion 17-20-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, where it
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provides that the County Clerk is "clerk of the district court"
and is "clerk of the board of county commissioners."

In Section

17-20-2 the Clerk's duties as Clerk of the court are enumerated,
and in Section 17-20-4 the Clerk's duties as County Clerk are
enumerated.

As Clerk of the Court he is no doubt under the juris-

diction and control of the judicial branch, and as County Clerk,
he can no doubt be considered a part of county government and subject to its rules.

Procedures on the county side of his job do not

become a part of the judicial branch merely because the Clerk has a
dual role.

Thus, even if Section 63-37-1, et seq., is applicable

to the County Clerk in his county role, it does not apply to him as
Clerk of the Court, and certainly not in contravention of the rules
of court.

Appellant himself concedes at page 6 of his brief that:

"It is obvious that the Courts are a separate branch
of government under the separation of powers of the Constitution of the State of Utah and as such, are not controlled
by the legislative pronouncements."
That admission appears to be dispositive of the matter.
In addition, however, the fact that the courts are nowhere
mentioned in Section 63-37-1, et seq., compels the conclusion that
the courts were not intended to be covered by it, and this same
result is compelled when one considers the rather absurd consequences that would result in the courts if mailing to the courts
were to be held to be the equivalent of filing with the courts. Let
us briefly consider some provisions of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
that would be affected if mailing to the court were to be held to
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be the equivalent of filing with the court.
Rule 3(a), URCP.

This rule provides that an action can

be conunenced by filing a complaint or by service of summons.

If

Section 63-37-1 were applicable, then the complaint would be filed
when mailed to the court.

Of course, one might raise the objection

that the complaint should not be deemed filed until the fee for
filing were actually paid.

However, Section 63-37-1 also applies

to "any payment required or authorized to be filed or made to the
state of Utah, or to any political subdivision thereof."

Thus,

under Section 63-37-1, a complaint mailed to court with the proper
fee would be deemed filed when mailed, notwithstanding it might not
be received by the Clerk for some days and perhaps for months if it
went astray.

This could create some considerable difficulty in many

areas, not the least of which could be in connection with the Statutes of Limitation.

What has been said with respect to conunencing

a suit by filing a complaint would apply with equal force to the
filing of a complaint after service of a ten-day summons.

Under

present practice, if a ten-day summons is served, but the complaint
is not filed within ten days, the action is deemed dismissed.

How-

ever, it mailing equals filing, then the status of the case could
be up in the air for a considerable period of time if the complaint,
filing fee and ten-day summons goes astray in the mail.

It would,

of course, be very easy for a party (we can assume that attorneys
would not engage in any such practice) to assert that he had
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actually mailed the documents to court earlier than they were
actually mailed, and this procedure would at the very least
impose upon the courts numerous hearings to determine the actual
date of mailing, which would probably not be a salutary thing to
inflict on the courts in view of their already overcrowded condition.
We desire also to call attention to the current form of
surrunons (see Form 1 of Appendix to Forms of Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure) .

The current form provides that the sununons state,

among other things, that defendant be notified· that

he is "hereby

summoned and required to file an answer in writing to the attached
complaint with the clerk of the above-entitled court, and to serve
upon, or mail to . . . plaintiff's attorneys, a copy of said answer."
Earlier forms of the surrunons required only that the answer be· served
within twenty days, but did not specify that the answer had to be
filed with the twenty days.

This created much uncertainty at court,

particularly in connection with applications for default judgments.
The requirement that the summons state that the answer be served
and filed within the twenty days no doubt sought to clarify this
confusion.

The position asserted by appellant, however, would

return us to that state of confusion.

If mailing is the equivalent

of filing, then a defendant could serve a copy of the answer to his
opponent and mail the original to the court.

The court, however,

would still not necessarily know on the twenty-first day whether an
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answer had been properly made.

Given the current postal service,

one can suppose that answers would come drizzling in one, two,
three or more days beyond the twentieth day, creating no end of
confusion.
Rule S(d), URCP.

This rule now contemplates no doubt

a physical filing of the papers with the court, but would hereafter
have to be construed as meaning that a party would only have to mail
the papers to court to satisfy the requirements o.f this rule.
Rule S(e), URCP.

As presently written, this rule provides

that papers can be filed with the judge. One supposes that if mailing
is the equivalent of filing, the papers mailed to the judge mightbe
construed to be filed when mailed to the judge.
ent judges might construe this differently.
endorse on the paper

t~e

Presumably differ-

Some judges might

date of the postmark on the envelope;. some

might endorse thereon the date they received the paper; and some
might decline to accept it· at all.

Other variations can be imagined,

all of which would seem to create more confusion--rather than less.
Rule 14(a), URCP. Under this rule, a third-party plaintiff
need not obtain leave to make service if he files a third-party complaint not later than ten days after he serves his original answer.
If mailing means filing, we introduce into third-party practice further ambiguities.
Rule 3l(c), URCP.
affected.

Practice under this rule would be

However, instead of giving notice of filing, one could

presumably meet the requirement here by giving notice ·of mailing to
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the court.
Rule 38(b), URCP.

This rule provides that jury trial

may be obtained by paying the statutory fee and serving a demand.
Since payments under 63-37-1, et seq., are effective when mailed7
a jury could be demanded and paid for by mail,

al~hough

the court

might never receive the documents relating thereto, or in any event
might receive them after some delay.

Most, if not all, of the dis-

trict courts have rules providing that demand for jury trial must
be made a given number of days prior to trial (ten days for example)
Under such a court rule, if the mail were delayed, the court might
not receive the jury demand until so close to the date for trial
that it would impose difficulties on the court in scheduling jury
trial and in arranging for juries.
Rule 41, URCP.

Under this rule a case can be dismissed

by filing a notice of dismissal or by filing a stipulation of dismissal at court.

If mailing is the equivalent of filing, then-

cases will be dismissed when notice of dismissal or stipulation is
mailed, although the court may have no record thereof at the time
of dismissal, and in some cases for some days thereafter, and in
some instances for protracted periods of time if these items are
lost in the mail.

This could result in serious consequences, par-

ticularly in the area of real estate titles.
Rule 5.1, URCP.

This rule provides for the filing of.

written requests for instructions.

To hold that the same can be

mailed results in an absurdity.
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Rule 54(d) (2), URCP.

This rule provides a memorandum

of costs must be served and filed within a five-day period.
Mailing this document to the court could again result in many
ambiguities, which would not be conducive to the expeditious
administration of justice.
Rule 58(a), URCP.

This rule provides that judgments are

deemed entered when they are signed and filed.

We can assume that

judges are usually present in the county in question when they sign
judgments and that the same will therefore normally be filed without incident.

However, in rural counties a judgment signed by a

judge in one county and then mailed by him to the proper county would
have to be· deemed

f~led

when mailed if mailing were held to be the

equivalent of filing, and this could conceivably create serious
problems in connection with land titles and in other areas as well.
Rule 68, URCP.

Rule 68 provides for deposits in court

and presumably under Section 63-37-1, et seq., if a check were
mailed to the court, mailing would create a good deposit, notwithstanding the court had not yet received the same and might not for
some time receive the same.
Appellate practice.

The present practice requires filing

of documents in connection with appeals to the Supreme Court in at
least the following instances:
Rule 73(a), Notice of Appeal,
Rule 73(c), Bond on Appeal,
Rule 73(g), Record on Appeal,
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Rule 73A, Docketing Statement,
Rule 75(a), Designation of Record,
Rule 75(a) (1), Certificate of Ordering Transcript,
Rule 75(b), Filing Transcript,
Rule 75(p) (1), Filing Appellant's Brief, Respondent's
Brief and Reply Briefs,
Rule 76(e) (1), Petition for Rehearing,
Rule 76(e) (2), Answer to Petition for Rehearing,
Rule 76(d) and
Rule 54(d) (3), Time for Seeking Costs After Filing
of Remittitur.
If Section 63-27-1, et seq., imposes on the courts the
rule that mailing is the equivalent of filing, then all of the
foregoing steps in the appellate procedure will satisfactorily be
met by litigants' mailing the items in question to the court.

The

effective date would be the date of mailing, not the date of filing.
Compliance with the rules of the court would be much more difficult
and ambiguities as to when an item was filed would be multiplied
many times over.

There would be practically no certainty as to

when any step were taken as that step would always be subject to
proof that the item in question had been mailed, notwithstanding
it was not received by the Supreme Court at any particular time.
One can imagine that this court, if it sought to attempt to enforce
compliance with its rules would be bombarded with an unending stream
of petitions of objections relating to late filings or petitions
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to determine the date of mailing, all of which would greatly
hinder the administration of justice in the Supreme Court.
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(2)

RULE 6(e) IS NOT APPLICABLE TO APPEALS TO THE SUPREME

COURT.
On pages 8 and 9 of appellant's brief, appellant constructs an argument

w~ich

attempts to demonstrate that appellant

actually had until December 16 in which to file Notice of Appeal.
As we understand it, this argument consists of the following
reasoning:

Appellant argues that Rule 77(d) provides that the

Clerk of the Court shall mail to the parties a notice of the
entry of an order or judgment.

The reasoning then proceeds that

since the Clerk is supposed to send such an order by mail, one must
assume that the order was mailed for purposes of computing time.
The argument then proceeds to Rule 6(e), which provides that "whenever a party has the right or is required to do some act or take
some proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a
notice or other paper upon him, and the notice or paper is served
upon him by mail, three days shall be added to the prescribed period.-"
From here the reasoning proceeds as follows:

That since the Order

Denying Motion for New Trial was entered on November 13, the onemonth period ended December 13, and if three days are added thereto
December 16 becomes the time for filing the appeal.
There are a number of serious problems, however, with this
reasoning.

First of all, it is directly contrary to the statute.

Appellant completely ignores the portions of Rule 77(d) which
directly preclude his argument.

We set forth Rule 77(d) in its

entirety and underline the relevant portions thereof omitted by appellant.
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"(d) Notice of Orders or Judgments.
At the time of
presenting any written order or judgment to the court for
signing, the party seeking such order or judgment shall
deposit with the clerk sufficient copies thereof for
mailing as hereinafter required.
Immediately upon the
entry of an order or judgment the clerk shall serve a
notice of the entry by mail in the manner provided for
.in Rule 5 upon each party who is not in default for
failure to appear, and shall make a note in the docket
of the mailing.
Such mailing is sufficient notice for
all purposes for which notice of the entry of an order
is required by these Rules; but any party may in addition
serve a notice of such entry in the manner provided in
Rule 5 for the service of papers. Lack of notice of the
entry by the clerk does not affect the time to appeal or
relieve or authorize the court to relieve a party for
failure to appeal within the time allowed."
It is readily seen that appellant has totally ignored
the direct mandate of Section 77(d) that failure by the Clerk to
send a notice of entry "does not affect the time to appeal or
relieve or authorize the court to relieve a party from failure
to appeal within the time allowed."

Thus, even if the Clerk fails

to send the notice of appeal, the appeal time remains unaffected.
In the instant case, the Clerk did not send a notice of
entry of judgment; rather notice thereof was sent by counsel for
the respondents.

It is thus inescapable that appellant's argument

runs squarely into, and is totally nullified by, the wording of
Rule 77(d).

Furthermore, Rule 6(e) provides that one is only

entitled to the additional three days if one is to take a certain
action within a prescribed period after service of a notice or
other paper upon him.

In the case of an appeal, the time for an

appeal does not run after notice of entry of judgment, but rather
runs after entry of judgment.

It is therefore clear that Rule 6(e)
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has no application to appeals.
Rule 73(a) provides:
19
When an appeal is permitted from a district court to
the Supreme court, the time within which an appeal may be
taken shall be one month from the date of the entry ... of
the judgment or order appealed from unless a shorter time
is prescribed by law . . • "

It is thus clear that the appeal time runs from the
entry of the order or

judgment~. not

from notice thereof.

The

rule is different with regard to an appeal from a city or justice
court to the district court.

Rule 73(h) provides:

"An appeal may be taken to the district court from
a final judgment rendered in a city or justice court
within one month after notice of the entry of such judgment, or within such shorter time as may be provided
by law."
Therefore, appellant's argument might have some validity
for an appeal to the district court.

It has no validity whatever

with regard to the Supreme Court.
POINT

II~

THE DOCTRINE OF EXCUSABLE NEGLECT IS NOT APPLICABLE IN
THIS CASE.
It should be noted that Rule 73(a) provides for a pro-

cedure to be followed in cases where there is "excusable neglect."
That rule provides for a determination of the issue of excusable
neglect by the district court where it is properly raised.

The

appellant has never claimed excusable neglect in this action; it
has never been asserted, either in the lower court or in this court.
There is a reference on page 8 of appellant's Reply Brief which
states:
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"It was reasonable for defendant-appellant's counsel
to expect that the Notice of Appeal mailed in the 10th of
December . . . would be received and docketed by the clerk
well before any appeal deadline."
Whether such an expectation was reasonable under all of
the circumstances, and whether counsel was justified in relying on
such an expectation or had some duty beyond such expectation, is
not before this Court.

Had there been excusable neglect, appellant

could have filed a petition so alleging and had a hearing on that
issue, but has never done that; it has never been sought either in
the lower court or in this court.

Had there been such a hearing,

the lower court could have ruled on the issue and either party,
aggrieved presumably, could have appealed the matter to this court
for consideration.

Under familiar doctrines of appellate review,

however, where the matter has not been raised in the lower court,
it is not available for review in this court.
On pages 10 and 11 of appellant's Reply Brief, appellant
cites the cases of Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 Fed 2d 1089 (9th Cir. 1980)
and United States v. Solley, 545 Fed 2d 874 (3rd Cir. 1976).

Appel-

lant cites those cases for the proposition, and said cases hold,
that notice of appeal is filed when it is received in the Clerk's
office, not when it is docketed in some formal way.

Appellant then

goes on to state that:
"Appellant was reasonably entitled to expect that it
(the notice of aooeal) was received in the Clerk's Office
prior to the dat~ ... on which it was entered on the docket."
We are not entirely certain what the appellant is saying
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here, but if appellant is saying that he was entitled to expect
that notice of appeal would be received in the Clerk's office
earlier than it was, then his relief, if any, would have been
under the provisions for excusable neglect.

If appellant is

saying that the notice of appeal was received in the Clerk's
office earlier than it was docketed, that assertion is totally
unsupported.

In the absence of clear evidence to the contrary,

the date stamped upon the notice of appeal must be presumed to be
the date upon which

~t

was received by the Clerk.

Therefore, Aldabe and Solley are not applicable under
the facts of this case.
Sanchez v. Board of Regents, 625 Fed 2d 521 (5th Cir.
1980) is illustrative of the principle of excusable neglect, which
has never been claimed by appellant, nor relief sought thereunder.
In Sanchez the notice of appeal was mailed timely, but was filed
out of time.

Appellee moved for dismissal.

The circuit court

remanded the case to the district court for hearing on excusable
neglect, which was
cuit court.

a

relief prayed for by appellant in the cir- ·

This case was before this honorable court in January

1982 on respondents' Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction,
and appellant did not request relief pursuant to the principle of
excusable neglect, but elected to stand upon his assertion that
his notice of appeal was timely filed under applicabl·e _law.

The

appellant has not sought such relief now and, indeed, having waited
a year and having permitted briefs in this matter to be filed and
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the case being now ready for oral argument, it would indeed be an
imposition upon the Court and counsel to consider the factual issue
of excusable neglect at this stage of the proceedings.
In The United States v. Nunley, 369 Fed.Supp. 171 (1973
D.C. Tenn), the court upheld the untimely filing of a notice of
appeal, but did so upon the ground that the clerk's office to which
the appeal was sent had been closed on two days when it should have
been open, and for this reason decreed that the appeal was timely.
The court stated:
"Obviously, had such Winchester District office of
the clerk been open with the deputy clerk in attendance
in accordance with the established schedule, the defendant's notice of an appeal was mailed in time for the
notice of appeal to have·been filed by such deputy clerk
within the required lO~day."
This case is cited by appellant,but reaffirms the position
of respondent that filing means actual receipt by the off ice of
the Clerk and not mailing, and in appropriate cases relief can be
sought under the principles of excusable neglect.

Relief pursuant

to excusable neglect has never been asserted, nor claimed by the
appellant, and the doctrine is inapplicable in this case.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, respondents respectfully
pray that appellant's appeal be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction,
or in the alternative that they be granted relief in accordance
with the brief of respondents heretofore filed herein.
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DATED this

day of February, 1983.
Respectfully submitted:

·GORDON A. MADSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and
Respondants
320 South Third East Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Mailed two copies of the foregoing brief to
M. Dayle Jeffs, attorney for appellant, at his address, 90 North
100 East, P. O. Box.683, Provo, Utah

84603, postage prepaid,

this ~~3......_~ day of February, 1983.
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